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LEGISLATIVE BASES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION-Economic depres-
sion, with its characteristic lessened production and deflation of values, finds
large corporations with excessive inventories and extensive contracts to purchase
raw materials, both based on an inflated price level." Forced to market its prod-
ucts at a price below the cost of production, the corporation is in a perilous con-
dition. Although financial collapse is more prevalent in times of distress, it may
of course also occur in a period of prosperity. Then, however, incompetence
and inexperience are the leading causes of failure.2  To these must be added
the increase of fixed charges out of proportion to earning power brought about
by unwarranted expansion or by unfortunate or costly investments which have
seriously depreciated.3 But whichever factor predominates, the result is evi-
denced.by the omission of dividends, failure to reduce the floating debt, and,
sooner or later, inability to meet the due installments on the secured indebted-
ness.
4
If a small organization were involved, the next step ordinarily would be in-
solvency proceedings in a bankruptcy court, terminating in the winding-up of the
business and the distribution of assets pro rata. But where the corporation is
large, transacting business on an enormous scale, and frequently in a field where
the public interest is involved, it often seems both expedient and desirable to
continue the business as a going concern.5 This can be done only by attracting
new money to the enterprise, enabling it to safely emerge from the period of
financial distress with the prospect of compensatory profits in the ensuing era
of prosperity. But banks and members of the investing public are unwilling
to put more money, unless secured by a prior lien, into an enterprise which has
already demonstrated its inability to meet its obligations. To so alter the cor-
porate structure as to allow the new money to dislodge the already existing liens
and priorities and convert impending debts into long-term obligations or stock
is the function of the reorganization.6
Sometimes a recapitalization can be effected voluntarily 7 by agreement be-
tween the various parties interested-usually the bondholders, the unsecured
'DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF COIPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1926) 1136. It is recognized
that these conditions are as pronounced today as in former depressions. See Stern, Financial
and Economic Review of i93o, WORLD ALMANAC (1931) 139.
-GERsTENBERG, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1924) 640.
'Prince, The Rock Island (1916) 19 MooDY's MAG. 409.
'It has been estimated that $243,oooooo in rail securities will fall due in i93-2 and that
only two roads, with $24,000,000 between them, have funds on hand to meet this debt. TIME,
January 4, 1932, p. 8.
'DEwING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 903-904. See Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 788.
'Reorganization, as a term, possesses no legal fixity of meaning. In general, however,
a corporate reorganization is "a conspicuous readjustment of the capital liabilities, ordi-
narily accompanied by a reduction in fixed charges, and by the addition of new capital,"
adopted to meet a financial crisis of some sort. DEWING, CORPORATE PROMOTIONS AND RE-
ORGANIZATIONS (1914) 7. Another definition is "the rearrangement of the financial struc-
ture of an incorporated enterprise, rendered necessary by insolvency or by the inability of
the corporation to secure the necessary funds for its operations because of obstacles resulting
from its financial structure." Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations, in SOtE LEGAL
PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1916) 154.
'Reorganizations are commonly classified as voluntary or involuntary on the' basis of
whether or not judicial proceedings are employed. DEWING, op. cit. supra note I, at 940-941.
They might more properly be designated as negotiated or litigated. GERsTENBERG, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 648. Other classifications are much more elaborate. Cook lists five cate-
(579)
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
creditors, and the stockholders.8 This avoids the expense and aggravation of a
receivership and its incidental litigation. The weak point of the scheme is that
no one can be compelled to come into such an arrangement against his willY A
bondholder may insist upon payment of the bonds or else foreclosure of the
mortgage.' A stockholder may demand that his interest be purchased from him
at a fair appraisal value." So too, a creditor, even though unsecured, retains
his claim against the assets of the corporation whether or not they have passed
to a new corporation as a result of the structural change.' 2 He cannot be com-
pelled to accept a change of creditors against his will.'
3
Since unanimity is seldom achieved in a project of this sort, it has become
customary to resort to legal proceedings in order that the status of the parties
be conclusively determined, either by foreclosure sale or decree of court. The
bondholders unquestionably have the right to foreclose the lien upon default. 4
Since purchasers at a sale of such magnitude as the foreclosure of a large corpo-
ration involves are necessarily quite scarce, the normal procedure is for the
bondholders, acting through their committee, 5 to buy in the property at a price
which is either fixed or approved by the court.'0 This "upset price" may be paid
with bonds which have been deposited with the committee.'1  Therefore, since
an outsider must have at his command sufficient funds to meet the entire fore-
closure bid, while the bondholders' committee need furnish actual cash only to
the extent of paying non-assenting bondholders their proportionate share, it
becomes apparent why reorganizations are usually effected by the bondholders.
It is entirely within the power of the secured creditors to exclude the other
groups altogether from the reorganization.:s But bondholders, who have dis-
played their caution by investing for security rather than for speculative profits,
are reluctant to part with the additional funds necessary to pay off the dissenting
bondholders and to provide sufficient working capital for the new organization.
The stockholders, on the other hand, to avoid losing their entire investment,
gories (I) Consent to scaling down of securities; (2) Reorganization by disposing of the
assets without a judicial sale; (3) Reorganization by court decree without sale; (4) Reor-
ganization on foreclosure or insolvency sale; (5) Reorganization in bankruptcy court. Cook,
Fraud and Ultra Vires in Reor.qanizatons (1924) lO A. B. A. J. 780, 782.
' Of course the classification of interested parties depends upon the particular corpo-
ration being reorganized. There may be several different 'classes of lienholders, or there
may be none. So, too, there may be preferred as well as common stock. But regardless
of priorities within a class, the general rule is that lienholders are preferred over the other
groups and the claims of the unsecured creditors are secondary to those of the lienholders
but superior to the rights of the stockholders. DEWING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 9.
'5 CooIC, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1023) § 883.
"BALLANTINE, MANUAL or CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1930) § 248; Hollister
v. Stewart, III N. Y. 644, 19 N. E. 782 (1899).
'This right is granted by statutes which also provide that the sale of the corporate
assets to the reorganized company must be approved by a specified number of stockholders
-usually two-thirds, sometimes a simple majority. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c.
6o, §§ 20-22; OHIO ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, 1930) § 8623.65; PA. STAT. (West, i920)
§ 5694, Act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 73, § 23, as amended by Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 724.
But while the majority has the right to control, it occupies a fiduciary relation to the minority,
and cannot exclude the minority from a fair participation in the transaction. Southern Pac.
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1919).
7 FLETCHim, CORPORATIONS (1919) §§ 4984-4985.
"BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note I0, at 761.
"I WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoREcLosURE (4th ed. 1927) § 41.
See Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganizations
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 899.
16 See Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization
(1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 132; Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization (1919) 32
HARv. L. REV. 489.
'Supra note I5.
' Supra note I, § 4935. See American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42
F. (2d) 886, 895 (W. D. N. Y. 193o).
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are quite willing to raise the required capital in return for the chance to recoup
losses out of the prospective profits of the new corporation. This is accomplished
by levying an assessment on the old stock; which, of course, is equivalent to sell-
ing them the new stock at the assessment price, the difference between the assess-
ment and the market price being the allowance conceded to the old stock. To
permit the stockholders to enter into the reorganization also avoids much quar-
relsome litigation concerning the fairness of the plan and the adequacy of the
upset price.
But the stockholders cannot co-operate with the bondholders to effect a' re-
organization if the unsecured creditors are excluded therefrom.10 The creditors
must be offered terms as good as or better than the stockholders are granted.
20
This is because the stockholders as owners of the property are subordinated to
the creditors whose priority cannot be ignored. 21 This is a fortiori true where
the corporation possesses unmortgaged assets as well as those subjected to the
lien.22 It has been held, however, that this does not mean that in every reorgan-
ization the securities offered to the general creditors must be superior in rank
or grade to those which the stockholders obtain, provided that the creditors are
accorded their superior rights in other ways.2 Even if they are offered terms
which compare favorably with those accorded to stockholders, the problem is
still far from solved. For creditors, "cold cash" possesses an allure which is quite
absent in stock of a reorganized company, however glowing the prospectuses.
Possibly the most difficult problem in a corporate reorganization is how to ex-
tinguish the claims of dissenting creditors with something other than cash.24
The most forceful solution is that embodied in the decision in the Phipps
case,2  in which the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit held that an offer
of the new securities will bar any recourse against the new corporation, and this
even though no judicial sale has been or will be contemplated. In other words,
under the doctrine of this case, a court may, by the force ofl its decree alone,
restrain creditors from resorting to any other method of collecting their debts
than that provided in the plan approved by the court. It is surely pertinent to
inquire as to the source of this enormous power of a court of equity to compel a
" Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, etc. Ry., 174 U. S. 674, 19 Sup. Ct. 827 (1899).
And one who is both a stockholder and creditor is not precluded from asserting his rights
as creditor by participating as stockholder. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Guardian Trust
Co., 240 U. S. 166, 36 Sup. Ct. 334 (1916).
"'Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (913).
' See Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, etc. Ry., supra note i9, at 685, 19 Sup. Ct. at830.
. See Note (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 1007, 1o8. In this connection it has been held
that where all the bondholders assent to the plan they are not entitled to any deficiency
judgment. Central Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, J. & M. Ry., 58 Fed. 5oo (N. D. Ohio 1892).
'Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549
(1926) ; Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co., 2o F. (2d) 8M8 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
'Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosenberg (1922)
22 CoL L. REv. 121.
- Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). Al-
though only the rights of unsecured creditors were involved in this case, there is no intima-
tion in the opinion that lienholders are exempt from similar treatment. In fact, the inference
is the other way. "The power of the court to deal in like manner with secured creditors has
never been expressly adjudicated but the theory . . . of the Phipps case would seem to
apply with at least equal force to secured creditors as it does to unsecured creditors. Indeed,
in one respect, the position of the unsecured creditor is economically stronger than that of
the mortgage bondholder. The, latter has voluntarily become an investor in securities gen-
erally having a ,far future maturity. The unsecured creditor had no prior means of ascer-
taining in advance the number of others in his class. He has usually loaned money on short
time or sold merchandise and expected cash payment. He never consented to become an in-
vestor." Rosenberg, Phlipps v. Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rv. 266,
271.
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creditor, against his will, to invest his debt in the debtor corporation and thereby
become one of the owners with all the liability incident thereto.
Curiously enough, although there must be statutory authority for a corpo-
ration to reorganize,2 6 there is no adequate legislation controlling the subject.
2 7
The Pennsylvania statute 28 is typical. This provides that the purchaser of the
property and franchise of a corporation at a judicial sale or by virtue of a power
of sale 2 9 may organize as a corporation and succeed to the privileges of the old
corporation. As to the manner in which claims shall be met; as to what coercive
measures may be employed to bring recalcitrant minorities into line; as to the
permissibility of dispensing with a sale in a reorganization by decree of court,
the statute is silent. The Maine law 30 is more explicit only in that it provides
that creditors must be paid ratably, and that the court may permit duly allowed
claims at a proper valuation to be accepted in payment of the purchase price.
Similarly, in Delaware, the property may be sold free of encumbrances at a judi-
cial sale on such credits as the court may deem proper.3 In some states, instead
of a general statute, a special law is passed to cover each particular reorganiza-
tion as it occurs.12 Except as to the scope of its application, such a statute is
similar to one of the general type. In other states, statutes are in force which
permit the reorganization of corporations of a restricted designated class. 33 The
Kentucky statute,3 4 which applies only to railroads and bridge companies, is
much more elaborate than most. It provides that if the holders of a majority of
any class of securities issued, or any class of creditors submit a plan for reorgan-
ization, the court, on approval of the plan, may require any security holder or
creditor to surrender for cancellation or discharge outstanding securities and
claims and receive in lieu the new securities. The force of this, however, is
considerably diminished by the next sentence of the act, which allows holders of
claims or securities which arose or were issued before the act was passed to insist
that their contract rights remain unimpaired. Although passed in 1896, it has
never been judicially criticized.
The Ohio statute, 5 applicable to railroads, provides that when two-thirds in
interest of each class of creditors and of stockholders agree upon a plan of re-
organization they may purchase the assets of the old corporation and reorganize
according to the plan, which must provide for "payment in money or bonds of
the highest class issued" for debts incurred for repairs or running expenses.
The rights of non-assenting creditors are defined in the vaguest of terms.36 When
counsel contended that under the act creditors had no rights other than those
8 THOMPSON, LAW OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5966.
Cook, op. cit. supra note 7, at 78o.
PA. LAWS (West, 1920) §§ 5805, 18569; Act of May 25, 1878, P. L. 145, § I, as amended
by Act of June 20, 1911, P. L. 3O92.
'Of course where the instrument under which the lien was created expressly provides
for a reorganization by the majority with the right to discharge the liens with securities,
the problem is simple. Such provisions, however, are not extensively used because of their
questionable negotiability. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments
of the Last Decade (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 9O1, 927. But cf. Note (927) 27 COL. L. REV.
579, 586-587.
ME. REV. STAT. (Peabody, 1930) c. 56, § 87.
DF.T REv. CODE (1915) § 1979.
'The Boston & Maine Railroad was reorganized under such an act. Mass. Spec. Acts
1915, c. 38o as extended by Spec. Acts 1937, c. 323. See Brown v. Boston and Maine R. R.,
233 Mass. 502, 124 N. E. 322 (1939).
'KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 771a.
Ibid.
OHIO ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, 393o) §§ 9o79, 9092.
§ 9095.
LEGISLATION
arising out of the reorganization plan, the court held unequivocally that any state
law which abrogates the rights of non-assenting creditors is invalid.37
Since no state has gone further than Kentucky or Ohio, and since those
statutes have been, in the one case, so guarded to avoid constitutional difficulties
as to be of little value, and in the other, declared unconstitutional, it seems clear
that the power of a court to compel creditors to accept payment in securities in-
stead of cash is not derived from any state statute. This is all the more apparent
in view of the constitutional limitation which forbids a state to pass laws impair-
ing the obligations of contracts.3 8 In the absence of federal legislation governing
corporate reorganizations, 0 it is necessary to conclude that the power exercised
by the court in the Phipps case is not one which has been conferred by statutory
law.
If not derived from legislation, the power, to exist, must be an inherent one.
That a court of equity has the power to so act, in the absence of statutory author-
ity, has been questioned by both bench and bar. In Harding v. Anerican Suma-
tra Tobacco Co.,40 Judge Sibley declared:
"This is a stretching of equity power beyond anything previously
known. To deprive a creditor of his usual remedies and force him into
membership into the corporation which he only credited seems to me of
very dubious correctness, however convenient and cheap it may be to reor-
ganizers, and however justly disappointing to recalcitrant creditors who may
be trying to force the majority to buy them out to get rid of them." 41
So, too, an attorney who has been very active in reorganization work has in-
sisted that
"the proposition . . that Federal courts of equity today have, without
legislation, inherent power to compel all creditors of an insolvent to accept
in complete extinguishment of their rights against the property of the in-
solvent something other than cash or even than promises to pay cash in the
future . . . is sound neither in legal theory nor in economic policy." 42
Further help is derived from a study of the situation in England where prac-
tically all reorganizations are effected by court decrees. There the court derives
its power, not from an inherent jurisdiction, but from the express terms of the
Companies Act 43 which provides that if a majority in number representing three-
fourths in value of each class affected by the reorganization agree on a plan
which is approved by the court, it is binding upon all. 44 This has been held to
'Mather v. Cincinnati Ry. Tunnel Co., 3 Ohio C. C. 284 (1888).
"U. S. CoNsT. Art. i, § io, cl. i.33Under the Federal Transportation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 456, H6 402, 407, 439; 49 U. S.
C. A. §§ i (I8), 5 (2), 2oa, the Interstate Commerce Commission has assumed, to a limited
extent, supervision over the reorganization of interstate railroads. See Swaine, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 931, n. NO.
,o 14 F. (2d) i68 (N. D. Ga. 1926).
"At 169.
Swaine, loc. cit. supra note 24.
"The Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, § 2; 32 & 33 VIcT. c. 104 (870) ; as
amended by The Companies Act, § 24; 63 & 64 VTcT. c. 48 (i9oo) ; and incorporated in the
Companies (Consolidation) Act, § 120; 8 EDW. VII, c. 69 (i9o8).
"' A similar result is reached in Canada by special statutes instead of general. See
Fraser, Reorganization of Companies in Canada (1927) 27 Co. L. REv. 932. Court de-
crees in accordance with these statutes are enforceable against American citizens. Canada
Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 3 Sup. Ct. 363 (883). But aliter where
the American court thinks the plan unfair, even though approved by an English court. Bank
of China, etc. v. Morse, i68 N. Y. 458, 61 N. E. 774 (901).
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apply to secured as well as unsecured creditors.41 In England, then, lienholders
can be subordinated to junior charges, and the minority of any class is bound by
the will of the majority.45 But it is significant to note that no English court has
ever exercised the power except under the statute. In America, the right of the
court to so act, in the absence of enabling legislation, is evidenced only by the
Rock Island cases .4  Thus it would seem that those decisions are at best ques-
tionable. It is greatly to be regretted that the Supreme Court was not given the
opportunity to review them.48
Even if the existence of the power is assumed, the wisdom of so acting is
further disputed. Its exercise involves tremendous possibilities. Since no stat-
ute fixes the proportion of persons whose assent to the plan is required to give
it validity, this would be left entirely to the discretion of the court, who might
feel free to enforce upon an unwilling majority a plan fostered by the minority,
as well as vice versa; or, further, a plan promulgated by the court itself and
desired by none of the factions. 49 This is not a mere remote possibility. There
is on record a case in which the plan finally adopted was one formulated by the
court and not by any of the litigants."0 In that case, there was apparently no
expressed objection to the final adoption of the court's plan. But supposing a
dissent, would it have been of any moment if the court possesses the power to
fix the status of all parties concerned by force of its decree alone? The power
of a court to pass upon the fairness of the plan 11 is something entirely different
from the power to make contracts for the parties."2  There is much to be said
for the statement of Judge Learned Hand:
"There is in my judgment no warrant either in principle or policy for
asserting that, once a receiver is appointed, the court takes on the part of a
benevolent despot." "'
Whether the danger that reorganizations will in time be governed by the
caprice of paternalistic courts is real or imagined, it would be sensible to avert it.
This could best be accomplished by a federal statute. We have an excellent
precedent and analogy in the Bankruptcy Act " which provides that a composi-
tion approved by a majority in number of creditors, representing a majority in
'lit re Empire Mining Company, 44 Ch. D. 402 (189o).
"In re Alabama, New Orleans, Tex. & Pac. Junction Ry. [i89i], I Ch. D. 213.
"Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., supra note 25; Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. Ry. v. Lincoln, etc., 284 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) (differs from Phipps case in
that Phipps had filed his claim with the reorganization committee while this creditor had
not, apparently a factor of no importance in the opinion of the court); both growing out
of American Steel Foundries v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry. (N. D. Ill. 1917) (not
reported but fully discussed by Walker, Reorganization by Decree (1921) 6 CORNELL L. Q.
154, 162).
" Certiorari granted 261 U. S. 61I, 43 Sup. Ct. 363 (1923) ; but dismissed per stipula-
tion of counsel, 262 U. S. 762, 43 Sup. Ct. 701 (5923).
" These possibilities have been suggested by Swaine, op. cit. supra note 24, at 130;
Cutcheon, An Examination of Devices Employed to Obviate the Embarrassments to Reor-
ganizations Created by the Boyd Case, in SomE LEGAL PHEASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 1926-i93o (I93I) at 70.
' See Rosenberg, The Aetna Explosives Case (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 733, 738.
' See Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., Inc., 296 Fed.
875, 879 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
"'I do not think that courts sit to redraw or modify or make suggestions concerning
such voluntary business arrangements as reorganization plans." Hough, J., in Conley v.
International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286, 287 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). Accrord: Berwind, White
Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co., 7 Porto Rico Fed. 30 (1914). But cf. Note (930)
30 COL. L. REv. 1013, 1020.
"Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., 5 F. (2d) 39, 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
-30 STAT. 544 (1898); U. S. C. A. Title II (1926).
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value of the claims allowed, shall, on confirmation by the court, be binding upon
all creditors. 5 This alone, however, is incompetent to govern the situation be-
cause it deals with the rights of unsecured creditors only,56 while a reorganization
must adjust the rights and liens of secured creditors and stockholders as well.
Furthermore, the Act does not compel the creditors to accept an aliquot interest
in the assets of the bankrupt instead of payment in cash.5
Modified to include these provisions, and also to call for approval by two-
thirds in number and value of each class concerned, rather than by a simple
majority,5 8 an adequate machinery to control corporate reorganizations would be
set in force without doing violence to our traditions.5 9 Such legislation would not
be unconstitutional as impairing the obligations of contracts, since that constitu-
tional prohibition 0 is directed against the states and not against Congress.6 '
Furthermore, Congress is specifically empowered to establish a uniform system
of bankruptcy laws 62 and to pass all laws necessary to carry such power into
effect." "Such a law, once enacted, would mark the end of one of the greatest
and worst of legal anachronisms." 64 It would secure to American business the
benefits which have existed under the English law since 1870.
The corporate reorganization plays a part in the world of modem industry
of far more importance than one might at first suspect. In 1916, it was esti-
mated that in the preceding twenty-year period, fifty per cent. of American cor-
porations had undergone reorganization.65 During the period of 1920-1923
"scores of industrial corporations became, in the equity sense, insolvent." 66 At
that time voluntary reorganizations by creditors' committees were attempted on
an extensive scale in order to avoid the publicity of receivership. However, due
to the many suits instituted against these committees for personal liability, it has
been doubted that readjustments will again be attempted to any great extent
without the aid of judicial proceedings. 67  Since the current depression makes
' § I2; i1 U. S. C. A. §3o.
'it re J. B. & J. M. Cornell Co., 2oi Fed. 381 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
"'In re Northampton Portland Cement Co., 185 Fed. 542 (E. D. Pa. i91i) ; In re Pru-
dential Outfitting Co., 25o Fed. 504 (S: D. N. Y. I918).
'To require the approval of a preponderating majority is more likely to insure the fair-
ness of the plan to all. Cutcheon has even suggested that the statute call for the assent of
9o% of each distinct class of creditors and two-thirds of the stockholders. Cutcheon, op. cit.
supra note 49, at 73.
"This scheme is approved by Swaine, op. cit. supra note 24; Cutcheon, op. cit. supra
note 49. Although at first favored by Rosenberg, in A New Schemw of Reorganizati ;
(1917) 17 Co. L. REv. 523, he later wrote, "Let us leave the growth of our jurisprudence
regarding this still developing subject of reorganization to our courts and the bar rather
than to what would be at once the terra incognita and the straitjacket of an Act of Con-
gress." Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 25, at 272.
U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § IO, cl. I.
Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 (1878); Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow
Co., 288 Pa. 230, 135 AUt. 759 (1927) ; see Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, supra note
44, at 539, 3 Sup. Ct. at 371 (1883). Although this is questioned in a dictinm in Hepburn v.
Griswold, 75 U. S. 6o3, 623 (1869), yet "It would in fact seem to be established that, because
Congress is not expressly prohibited from passing any laxN impairing the obligation of con-
tracts, it may, in the exercise of powers that are expressly given it, enact laws the indirect
effect of which is to impair the obligation of contracts previously entered into." 2 WIt.-
LOUGHRY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 1253.
'U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
" Cutcheon, op. cit. supra note 49, at 75.
'Judge Hough, as quoted by Cravath, op. cit. supra note 6, at 154.
Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade
(1928) 28 Co.. L. REv. :29.
" Ibid. 32.
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imminent many corporate insolvencies,6 s the question of reorganization is again
brought to a focus. The need for adequate legislation is again felt. Certainly
it would be advantageous to enable corporations to make the structural changes
necessary to accommodate their present needs and possibilities for future growth
without the delay, uncertainty, expense, and confusion which now exist. It is
neither unreasonable nor inequitable to disarm a recalcitrant minority, of the
weapon by which it seeks to force the majority to grant it terms entirely dispro-
portionate to the number and value of the claims represented. As was said by
the Supreme Court of the United States, as long ago as 1883.
"It seems eminently proper that where the legislative power exists some
statutory provision should be made for binding the minority in a reasonable
way by the will of the majority." 69
A.B.
See sukra notes I and 4. The immediate situation is so serious that Congress has cre-
ated, in accordance with President Hoover's suggestion, a Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion to lend $2,ooo,ooo,ooo to hard-hit industries unable to get credit elsewhere. U. S. DAILY,
Jan. 23, 1932, at 2647; TImE, Jan. 25, 1932, P. II.
' Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, supra note 44, at 535, 3 Sup. Ct. at 368.
